Does public ownership affect business performance? : empirical evidence with panel data from the Spanish manufacturing sector by Hernández de Cos, Pablo et al.
DOES PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
AFFECT BUSINESS 
PERFORMANCE?
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
WITH PANEL DATA
FROM THE SPANISH 
MANUFACTURING
SECTOR 
Pablo Hernandez de Cos,
Isabel Argimón
and José Manuel González-Paramo
Banco de España - Servicio de Estudios
Documento de Trabajo nº 0019
DOES PUBLIC OWNERSHIP 
AFFECT BUSINESS 
PERFORMANCE? 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
WITH PANEL DATA 
FROM THE SPANISH 
MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR (*) 
Pablo Hernandez de COS 
BANCO DE ESPANA 
Isabel Argim6n 
HMTREASURY 
Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo 
UNlVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE 
(*) We are very grateful to different members of the Research Department of tbe Banco de 
Espana and, especially, to O. Bover, A. Estrada, L Hernando, S. Nliiiez y J. Valles, for their 
suggestions and comments. We also thank the Banco de Espana Central Balance Sheet Office 
for providing the data. 
Banco de Espana - Servicio de Estudios 
Documento de Trabajo n2 0019 
In publishing this series the Banco de Espana seeks to disseminate 
studies of interest that will help acquaint readers better 
with the Spanish economy. 
The analyses, opinions and findings of these papers represent 
the views of their authors; they are not necessarily those 
of the Banco de Espana. 
The Banco de Espana disseminates its main reports and most 
of its publications via the INTERNET at the following website: 
http://www.bde.es 
ISSN: 0213-2710 
ISBN: 84-7793-732-X 
Dep6sito legal: M. 7755·2001 
Imprenta del Banco de Espana 
ABSTRACT 
This paper offers empirical evidence for the Spanish case on the hypothesis that 
public ownership may be a determinant of a firm's performance. Two alternative definitions 
of efficiency are proposed: relative productivity and profitability. The role of ownership is 
tested, conditioning for the degree of competition, the financial position of the firm and 
labour quality. The data used is a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 
1983-1996. The results show that ownership is not a determinant of efficiency and that 
other factors, in particular, the degree of competition, seem to have a positive and 
significant effect on a firm's performance. Although a negative relationship is found between 
public ownership and efficiency, it is not statistically different from zero . .  However, the 
constancy of ownership over time might explain this lack of significance, given that the 
model is estimated in first differences. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The privatisation of state-owned firms has been one of the most widespread public 
policies carried out in economies all over the world in recent years. Spain has also followed 
this trend and, in fact, privatisation proceeds have amounted, on average, to close to 0.4 
percentage points of GDP in the period 1989-1998. 
The aims of privatisation have been very varied. Yarrow (1986) points at the 
following objectives in the British case: improving firms' efficiency; lessening public 
borrowing requirements; weakening trade union power; reducing the role of government in 
the corporate world; broadening the shareholder base; providing greater access to capital 
markets for the general public and, in particular, for workers to their own firms' shares; and 
income redistribution. In broad terms, three main aims may be identified for privatisation: 
improving efficiency, increasing general government revenue and redistributing income 
(Albi, Contreras, Gonzalez-Paramo and Zubiri, 1994). 
This paper focuses on the first of the above arguments, namely privatisation as a 
means to improve efficiency, which entails analysing the relationship between public/private 
ownership and the associated efficiency. Nonetheless, comparing efficiency between public 
and private firms is a complex issue. On the one hand, the comparison must be made under 
homogenous conditions, i.e. taking into account, for instance, the different sectors in which 
the firms operate and the degree of competition they face, which means isolating the role of 
ownership from other potential determinants of efficiency. On. the another, a public 
enterprise may have objectives other than mere profit maximisation, whereby the 
comparison with its private-sector counterparts on the basis of this criterion may prove 
inappropriate. It is generally accepted that the only goal a public enterprise cannot elude is 
that of productive efficiency, i.e. the maximisation of the level of output given a specific level 
of inputs: therefore the comparison between public and private firms should be made in 
terms of this goal (Perelman and Pestieau, 1994). 
This paper intends to offer empirical evidence for the Spanish case on the 
hypothesis that public ownership of firms may be a determinant of their efficiency. Two 
alternative definitions of efficiency are used: relative productivity and profitability. The former 
tries to approximate the concept of technical or productive efficiency, while the latter is more 
connected with allocative or price efficiency, involving minimising costs of producing a level 
of output, given the prices of inputs and their marginal productivities. Furthermore, the 
paper aims at isolating the role of ownership by controlling for other potential determinants 
of efficiency, in particular the degree of competition, the financial position of the firm and 
labour quality. The test is carried out on a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms, drawn 
from the Banco de Espana Central Balance Sheet Office, for the period 1983-1996. In 
Argimon, Artola and Gonzalez-Paramo (1999), a sample of firms of 1994 from the same 
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source was used to test the same hypothesis. The construction of the panel has some 
advantages over the cross-section approach. On the one hand, it provides instruments to 
be used to avoid possible simultaneity biases. On the other, it allows a more streamlined 
construction of certain variables, in particular the firms' capital stock. Howev�r, it requires 
that estimation take into account the presence of individual effects: the bias arising from the 
possible correlation of the individual effects with the regressors has to be avoided. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second section reviews the theoretical 
arguments and the available empirical evidence on the relationship between public 
ownership and business efficiency. The indicators of efficiency used in this paper are then 
discussed and the empirical model employed is formulated. The fourth section offers a brief 
analysis of possible determinants of business efficiency other than ownership, whose 
relevance will also be tested. The fifth section describes the main characteristics of public 
and private firms in the sample. The results of the tests are presented in the sixth section. 
Finally, the seventh section draws the main conclusions. 
2. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND EFFICIENCY OF THE FIRM. A REVIEW OF 
THE LITERATURE. 
The fundamental theoretical framework that analyses the relationship between 
public ownership and firm performance is provided by the so-called agency theory. Under 
this theory, public in comparison to private ownership introduces at least two main 
differences into the principal-agent (shareholder-manager) relationship: a) the goals of the 
principal are not the same under both types of firm: political or welfare goals in the case of 
public enterprise compared to profit-driven goals in the private firm; b) managers of state­
owned enterprises have to face two principals, voters and the government, while there is 
only one principal, namely shareholders in the case of private firms, with the exception of 
regulated private enterprises, where the industry regulator has also to be considered. The 
issue at skate is whether these principal-agent differences also lead to differences in 
efficiency. The theoretical response, however, requires that the environment in which 
business activity unfolds (competitive sectors compared to sectors subject to market failure) 
should be defined, since this may affect the comparison. 
A) COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES 
This first section attempts to compare the efficiency of public and private firms in a 
competitive environment, that is with neither market failure nor regulated private firms. 
According to microeconomic theory, under perfect competition, the search for profit 
maximisation of private firms ensures efficiency (both technical and allocative). Public 
enterprises could, in principle, attain the same level of efficiency as private firms. 
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Nonetheless, the literature highlights certain problems affecting public enterprises which 
hamper the achievement of this goal. 
1 .  The existence of different principals, to which we have already referred above, 
and the possible competition between such principals may lead to a more complex and 
diffuse definition of agents' goals. Thus, public firms do not have a single goal and, more 
important, the objectives are not fixed over time. In relation to the multiplicity of objectives it 
can be said that the Parliament's aims (voters' representatives) are different from those of 
the government, and moreover, different ministers may pursue different objectives (increase 
in employment, reduction of the deficit, improvement in efficiency, etc. [Aharoni, 1 981]). The 
problem of public enterprises would not, however, be the plethora of goals in itself, but the 
fact that such goals are either contradictory, or are not clearly defined or clash with 
efficiency. 
Secondly, the objectives of public firms change over time. A change in govemment, 
for instance, may radically alter the guiding principles and targets initially laid down, and 
they may even contradict those set by the previous Cabinet. This fact, which is undoubtedly 
known to the managers of public enterprises, prevents them from taking decisions with a 
medium- and long-term perspective, with the subsequent costs in terms of efficiency. 
2. The very existence of a vague definition of ownership of state-owned enterprises 
lessens shareholders' (Le. voters or members of the government) incentive to exert control 
over the firms' managers. Any action of control taken by a shareholder and the ensuing 
gains in efficiency arising therefrom would be shared among the rest, favouring the "free 
riders". 
It can be argued that the problem of deficient control of agents also happens in 
private firms, especially those with wide-ranging and dispersed shareholder structures. 
However, in the case of public enterprises, the diffusion of ownership is always greater 
(insofar as the ultimate shareholders are the general public [Alchian and Demsetz, 1972]) 
and, if this is not the case, it is due to the presence of lobbying that influences management, 
pursuing their own interest and not that of the community (trade unions, consumers, 
suppliers). These groups are more aggressive in the pursuit of their own interest than the 
principals of the firm and may attain benefits for themselves at the expense of losses for the 
community (Zeckhauser and Hom, 1989). 
In fact, the large number of intermediaries between voters and managers (voters, 
Parliament, government, ministers, managers). hampers control even more. 
3. Public firms are not subject to the external control of capital markets, that reduces 
many of the inefficiencies facing private firms, and acts as a disciplining mechanism of 
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management conduct. This lack of control via the capital markets leads to at least two 
potential adverse effects on the efficiency of public firms: 
a) The firm's share prices on the capital market contain infonnation about the future 
of the firm and, therefore, they may be used as a means of evaluating the long-term effects 
of management decisions. In the case of public firms, since these prices are not available, 
principals lose an instrument of control, thereby reducing the incentive of management to 
act appropriately. 
It can be argued that financial markets are not efficient or cannot be regarded as the 
best instrument for obtaining external information on the financial state of the firm. Further, 
this argument would not be valid for the so-called mixed firms, Le. those in which the State 
has a share and the rest is privately owned. Holmstrom and Tirole (1991) argue, however, 
that even in this latter case, the control provided by the market is lost owing to the illiquidity 
that state participation gives rise to in connection with the rest of the shares. 
b) The impossibility of bids by another group of shareholders to take a public firm 
means managers cannot lose their job in the face of changes in ownership. The argument 
runs as follows: given inefficient management, share prices fall and, consequently, the 
possibility of a private firm being bought by other shareholders increases, with the resulting 
replacement of the management responsible for such inefficiency. Once more, in the case 
of public firms, the disciplinary role of the market is lacking. 
This argument has also received several criticisms. First, it could be argued that 
managers of public enterprises are also fired and that there are political takeover bids, 
although these are often motivated more by changes in' government than by inefficient 
management. Moreover, Grossman and Hart (1980) point out that, in the face of a takeover 
bid, the current shareholders, antiCipating the gain in efficiency brought about by the change 
in the firm management, do not sell their shares at prices that make the bid attractive, 
thereby reducing the possibility of these operations successfully being carried out. Other 
authors stress the different types of pre-emptive defensive action managers can take in 
order to lessen and, indeed, eliminate the attractiveness of these purchase operations; 
managers could, for instance, pursue size rather than profit maximisation, making finns a 
difficult purchase target (Scherer, 1980). Lastly, certain authors (Franks and Mayer, 1990) 
indicate that the possibility of takeover bids could have adverse effects on efficiency since it 
reduces investment in specific human capital, lowering the value of a long-term managerial 
investment. 
In any event, what is evident is the fact that the effectiveness of the control exerted 
by the capital markets largely depends on the characteristics of the country analysed. In this 
sense, factors such as the legal shareholder safeguards, the restrictions imposed by 
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competition law or the tax system are decisive. This would partly account for the scant 
number of operations of this type in certain countries (Japan and Germany, for example). 
4. The impossibility of public firms going bankrupt eliminates a further instrument for 
controlling the firm's management. This argument is also known as the soft budgetary 
constraint: any possible lag between revenue and expenditure is balanced by the 
govemment. In this way, the price mechanism ceases to be a determining factor of 
management behaviour. Managers can generate income overpaying suppliers, with the 
latter competing for this income and offering managers compensation in exchange for 
securing specific contracts. Other pressure groups, such as trade unions, use the existence 
of this soft budgetary constraint to their own advantage (Kornai, 1980). 
It should not be forgotten, however, that the State has often come to rescue ailing 
private firms, with bankruptcy being, in many cases, the reason for nationalisation. 
5. Management incentive schemes based on productivity are rarely found in state­
owned enterprises. This is largely because of the multiple and diffuse goals referred to 
earlier. On the one hand, the achievement of some of the goals entrusted to public 
enterprises is difficult to evaluate because of the difficulty of finding indicators to measure 
performance. On the other, the multiplicity of objectives require that weights be established 
for each of them in case there should be some incompatibility among them. These weights 
are, however, difficult to set since the potential trade-off between the different goals is not 
accurately known (Tirole, 1 994). The impossibility of establishing management incentive 
mechanisms related to productivity tends to lead managers to pursue their own interests. 
Moreover, pay structures in public firms are set taking government and civil service 
pay as a reference, which acts as a ceiling (Gonzalez-Paramo, 1995). 
6. Laffonte and Tirole (1993) argue that managers of public firms do not invest 
enough because once investment is finalised, the government can always earmark it for 
purposes other than that for which it was made. This is what is known as the possibility of 
investment expropriation. 
This argument cannot, however, distinguish between public and private enterprises 
as there is nothing to prevent the shareholders of a private firm from expropriating the 
investment made by the managers, although there will be fewer incentives in this latter 
case. 
7. The political nature of the principals of public firms which, as we have seen, 
influences goal-setting, is also a determinant of management-selection conditions. 
Accordingly, appOintments are not based so much on managerial capacity or effectiveness 
as on affiliation to the political party in power, confidence, etc. (Gonzalez-Paramo, 1995). 
-11-
8. Public enterprises are, in many cases, subject to the same administrative and 
financial controls as the rest of the State Administration. The essential aim of these controls 
is to preserve the legality of public-sector managers' conduct, without taking into account 
their level of efficiency, which is conducive to the emergence of routine and bureaucratic 
procedures that stifle appropriate and much-needed corporate dynamism. 
This strong public control causes an excessive centralisation of decision-making, 
leading to a loss of independence on the part of middle management (Cuervo, 1997) and a 
concentration of decision-making at the highest executive level (Femandez, 1985). 
9. Some authors (Grassini, 1981;  Cuervo, 1997) highlight the role played by trade 
unions in public enterprises in causing inefficiency, as they use their strength as a source of 
income generation. 
It could, therefore, be argued that, compared to private firms in competitive markets, 
state-owned enterprises are less likely to achieve efficiency. Moreover, the empirical 
evidence available supports this view (Borcherding, Pommerehne and Schneider, 1982; 
Millward and Parker, 1983; Boardman and Vining, 1989), with only scant exceptions 
(Milward, 1990 and Tulkens, 1 993). 
One particular case in the comparison we are reviewing is that of mixed ownership. 
From a theoretical standpoint, Boardman, Eckel and Vining (1986) find that mixed 
enterprises may be more efficient than public ones insofar as the latter can reconcile profit 
maximisation with social goals, provide internal information cheaply to the government and 
reduce their bureaucratic controls. The empirical evidence (Boardman and Vinig, 1989) 
shows, however, that mixed enterprises, in terms of profitability, obtain the same or worse 
results than public enterprises, while in terms of efficiency they are the same or just better. 
This result might be warranted by the existence of conflict between the two owner-principals 
(private and public sector) of the mixed enterprise. 
Lastly, the literature emphasises the significance of competitive conditions as a 
pivotal factor in enhancing the efficiency of public and private enterprises (Yeaple and 
Moskowitz, 1995). Some authors (Kay and Thompson, 1986; Vickers and Yarrow, 1989) 
indicate that the development of competitive markets may be more important than the 
question of ownership. 
B) NON-COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES 
The foregoing analysis becomes more complicated when seeking to compare the 
efficiency of the public as opposed to the private enterprise in non-competitive markets or 
those subject to market failure. In these cases, private enterprises ensure neither technical 
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efficiency (we may recall, for instance, the' cases of X-inefficiency' in monopolistic markets; 
Leibenstein, 1978) nor allocative efficiency. A new factor, regulation, thus appears in the 
analysis. Regulation may allow both types of efficiency to be achieved, but new agency 
problems arise that hamper overall assessment of the results. 
If we attempt to compare the efficiency of a public firm and a non-regulated private 
enterprise engaged in an industry subject to market failure, the result of the comparison is 
not clear. First, the non-regulated private enterprise ceases to be technically efficient since, 
as we have indicated, X-inefficiency problems emerge associated with the lack of 
competition. In this case the market failing is not resolved either and, therefore, allocative 
efficiency is not attained. Public firms, on the other hand, remain subject to the same 
inefficiencies referred to earlier. The choice now is between two imperfect alternatives. If we 
assume that the inefficiency of the private enterprise is positively related to the scale of the 
market failing and that the inefficiency of public firms depends positively on the significance 
of political motivation in the design of goals, we obtain the result that privatisation will be all 
the more desirable the lesser the significance of the market failure and the greater the 
weight of political goals in the fUnction of the principal of the public enterprise. Otherwise, 
private ownership may cause greater inefficiencies than those generated by public one. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1989) present a model summarising the trade-off between 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency when a monopolistic public enterprise is 
compared to a non-regulated private monopoly. Insofar as privatisation involves a change in 
the firm's ultimate goal, namely profit maximisation at the private enterprise as opposed to 
the maximisation of social welfare at the public firm, prices will tend to increase towards 
their monopolistic equilibrium levels. This undoubtedly entails losses in terms of allocative 
efficiency. Conversely, the private monopoly has greater incentives to reduce costs and, 
therefore, privatisation prompts an improvement in terms of technical efficiency (80S, 1991). 
However, the most suitable analytical framework given the presence of market 
failure is that resulting from the comparison of public and regulated private firms. Regulation 
enables the firm to retain its profit maximisation goal (though not in all cases). However, it 
also alters agency relationships by setting management against two types of principals: 
shareholders and the regulatory agency. In this way, the factors indicated earlier as the 
causes of the relative inefficiency of public firms in a competitive setting appear here to a 
greater or lesser extent. We resume below the main problems facing the regulated private 
firm. 
1. Regulated firms also have ambiguous and changing goals. The complexity of 
govemmental goals and the continuous changes therein affect this type of firm. Indeed, in 
, X-inefficiency refers to those inefficiencies arising from the behaviour of individuals in organisations not subject to market 
discipline, as a result of the lack of appropriate control mechanisms and incentives. 
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the case of regulated firms where two principals - shareholders and regulators - have 
different, varying interests, the definition of goals is even more diffuse and changing than at 
public firms, due to the conflict of interests between the two. As Laffont and Tirole (1993) 
indicate, the negative effects of this conflict tend to be fewer the more stable and defined 
the regulatory framework is. 
2. Different lobbies press governments to regulate specific industries or to regulate 
them according to their interests. Consequently, this issue does not allow us to distinguish 
between public and private regulated enterprises. 
3. The aim of regulation is not exclusively profit maximisation; rather, in many cases, 
distributive or other goals similar to those set for public enterprises are assigned. As a 
result, the problems generated by such a plethora of goals also appear in regulated private 
enterprises. 
4. These enterprises face soft budgetary constraints. Frequently, governments come 
to the help of ailing regulated firms, perhaps not through explicit subsidies but certainly 
accepting, for instance, price increases. 
5. The managers of regulated firms are at an advantage in relation to the regulator 
as they have all information on the firm's essential variables (Shapiro and Willig, 1990). This 
information is, moreover, of primary importance for decision-making by the regulatory 
agency. Management control of information can be used to its own benefit, with such 
conduct inherently generating inefficiency. In fact, in most models comparing the efficiency 
public as opposed to regulated private firms (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Shapiro and Willig, 
1990), privatisation leads to a reduction in the effort made by managers. However, Shapiro 
and Willig (1990) point out that privatisation also reduces the possibility of government 
members pursuing their own goals. While government members have all available 
information on the firm's relevant variables, the regulator only obtains information indirectly. 
Privatisation WOUld, therefore, be a means of reducing the inefficiency brought about by 
government members or bureaucrats pursuing their own goals in a context in which they 
have all the information on the firm. Privatisation creates an information barrier between 
bUreaucrats and the managers of the regulated firm which prevents the former from 
pursuing their objectives with the same ease as in the case of public ownership of the firm. 
In light of all these arguments, comparison of the efficiency of public as opposed to 
regulated private firms does not lead to conclusive results. Nor does the empirical evidence 
available generally find greater efficiency at regulated private enterprises than at public 
firms. State-owned enterprises obtain the same or better results in the case of natural 
monopolies or highly regulated duopolies (electric and water utilities, for example) while the 
relative efficiency of private firms is greater in services susceptible to being operated on a 
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concerted or concessionary basis (health and educational services, non-rail transport or 
postal services, among others) (Gonzalez-Paramo, 1995). In this respect, defining the most 
appropriate regulatory framework in each non-competitive situation is the key element for 
ensuring efficiency is achieved in these sectors. 
Table 1 draws together the evidence available for the case of Spain. The table 
summarises the main characteristics of each paper: data sources, methodology and main 
results. Two conclusions may apparently be drawn from these results: a) using overall 
productivity or labour productivity indices, private enterprises show greater levels of 
efficiency than public ones; b) competitive conditions positively affect efficiency. 
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TABLE 1: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN SPAIN ON THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PUBUC ENTERPRISES 
Statislical 
information 
Methodology -
Conclusions -
Myro (1985) 
AGGREGATE 
Sources: "Las 
Grandes 
Empresas 
Industriales en 
Espa"a 1980-
1981' and 
"Resumen de 
Actividades de 
las Empresas 
deilNI en 
1980' 
Period: 1980. 
Measure of 
total factor 
productivity as 
ratio of value 
added to inputs 
used in its 
production (K 
y l) 
lowe' 
measured 
labOur and 
capital 
productivity in 
INI enterprises 
as a whole 
Fedea (1987) 
INDIVIDUAL 
data from firms 
in the 
manufacturing 
.. do< 
(excluding 
energy and 
mining 
industry) 
Source: CBBE 
Period: 1985 
Total factor 
productivity 
index 
Predominance 
of relatively 
ineffICient 
public 
enterprises 
compared to 
private-sector 
counterparts, 
accounting for 
64% of the 
sample. 
Prior, Verges, 
Vilardell (1993) 
Sanchis (1996) Argim6n, Artola and 
Gonzalez-Paramo 
(1999) 
AGGREGATE 
sectoral 
information 
Source: CBSe 
for private 
enterprises and 
CICEP (Centro 
de InformaciOn 
Contable de la 
Empresa 
publica) 
Period: 1981· 
84 
Sample of 
public 
enterprises 
(INI-INH) that 
have been 
privatised 
arid/or 
undergone 
restructuring. 
Source: INI 
and INH 
Annual Reports 
Informe sabre 
la Industria 
Esparlola 
- Period: 1978-1990 
FARREL's 
methodology to 
determine the 
absolute 
efficient frontier 
and rates of 
change of total 
factor 
productivity 
Non-parametric 
estimation of 
the coefficients 
relative to 
successive 
sectoral 
production 
functions 
Overall, greater -
productive 
effICiency 
among private 
enterprises, 
although with 
strong 
differences 
across sectors. 
- 16-
Calculation of-
measured 
labour 
productivity 
(firm and 
sectoral 
average) 
Econometric 
analysis of the 
effects of 
restructuring, 
privatisation 
and broder 
competition on 
productivity. 
The effects of -
privatisation 
,,' 
restructuring 
have generally 
been positive 
for productivity 
Increases in 
competition 
significantly 
raise 
productivity 
INDIVIDUAL 
data 
Source: CSSE 
Period: 1994 
All sectors. 
Measured 
labOur 
productivity 
index (Baldwin, 
1992) 
Average 
effICiency of 
public firms is 
lower than that 
of the other 
firms 
Competitive 
conditions 
defining the 
market 
contribute 
significantly to 
explaining 
relative 
effICiency. 
3. MEASURES OF PRODUCTIVITY. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
METHOD 
To compare the performance between state-owned and private enterprises we first 
need to agree on the definition of efficiency that we are going to use. A firm is technically 
efficient if it is at the limit of its production possibilities, Le. if it cannot produce more of a 
good without increasing the amount of inputs used. And it is in a position of altocative 
efficiency if it is minimising production costs or maximising profit, which means not only that 
it is technically efficient but that it is using the most adequate input mix, given input prices 
and marginal productivities. 
Since the objectives of public enterprises may differ from mere profit maximisation 
(mainly as a result of the redistributive function of the State) and given that the criterion of 
productive efficiency alone seems to be compatible with other objectives, comparison will 
be carried out in terms of productive efficiency. Nonetheless, and in order to analyse the 
sensitivity of the results to other definitions of efficiency, the comparison will also be made 
on the basis of the profit criterion. 
3.1. PERFORMANCE MEASURES: RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY AND PROFITABILITY 
First, following Baldwin (1992), relative productivity is adopted as a reference for 
measuring performance. The efficiency indicator proposed compares the output per 
employee of each firm with the average output per employee of the set of most productive 
firms in a sector. Specifically, the efficiency indicator of a firm is defined as the ratio of 
actual output to potential output, which is calculated for each firm as the product of the level 
of employment and the efficient level of output per person in the sector j to which the firm 
belongs. In turn, the efficient level of output per person in a sector is defined as the ratio of 
aggregate output to aggregate employment in the group 8j made up of the most productive 
firms in the sector. 
Analysing the technical efficiency of the firm with an indicator based on a measure of 
output per employee instead of total factor productivity implies implicitly that the goal of the 
firm is to maximise this variable and that those firms achieving the highest output per 
employee should be imitated. Under this approach it is assumed that labour is an 
homogenous input and that each sector is defined by a specific technology. Therefore, the 
index proposed is not an exact measure of technical efficiency but rather an approximation 
to the real indicator. In any event, Baldwin's index appears to be highly correlated with other 
more perfect measures [(see Baldwin, 1 992)]. 
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The firms in the reference set, BJ, are the most productive firms, K, in the sector. 
These firms have to account for at least, 10% of the value added of the sector (in relation to 
the firms included in the sample)2. 
The efficiency indicator of a firm i belonging to sector j, which shall be called k10ij, 
when output per person is defined as gross value added per employee3, is therefore: 
where: 
GVA, 
GVA1'iJ 
GVAij= Value added of firm i in sector j. 
GVA;;' = Potential value added of firm i in sector j. 
lij = number of employees in firm i in sector j. 
The second factor of expression [2} is the efficient level of output per person in 
sector j to which firm i belongs. 
k10ij can be calculated for each year (t) of the sample. 
In addition, we will use the return on net assets (RAN) 4 as a second definition of 
efficiency. This indicator is adopted as a reference for measuring efficiency in the allocation 
of resources5. 
2 Alternative definitions of the efficiency index have also been tested, based on the reference set of firms (61) contributing at 
least 20% or 30% to the value added of the industry, without the results being significantly affected. 
1 Alternatively, labour productivity can be defined as production per employee. This second definition has also been tested 
and the results are basically the same . 
• Other definitions of profitability (return on equity. financial profitability, economic profitability) have been tested and the 
results are basically the same. 
S This indicator can only be considered a proxy of the economic profit of the firm since it is obtained from accounting 
information that might not provide a good approximation to the relevant economic concept (for example, this is the case of the 
depreciation of assets and the corresponding amortisation charges). 
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3.2. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The relative performance of public and private enterprises in relation to efficiency will 
be tested using the two proposed definitions. First, from a Cobb-Douglas production 
function (Yjt = A �� 40.), reordered and specified in logarithmic form (small case letters), we 
derive an equation whose dependent variable is the previously defined index 5, We, then, 
include an additional regressor which measures relative public ownership (KPUDln, so 
that the equation to be estimated becomes: 
logklOi,=Yo+YIKPUDITi,+/3(k;,-iil)+(a+/3-I)IIt+ f. ¢mXmil+&it [3] m=1 
We allow the coefficients of the capital-labour ratio and of the labour variable to 
differ for each sector so as to reflect the technological differences across sectors in terms of 
capital intenSity and returns to scale. As a result, the equation becomes: 
Under this formulation, the variable to be explained • the previously defined 
efficiency index - depends on the capital·labour ratio (kit -lit), the labour variable (lit), a 
variable that measures the proportion of public to total capital in the firm (KPUDIT), and a 
set of variables that aim to approximate other relevant factors for productivity1 (Xii)' 
The estimated coefficients will capture the effect of the level of the regressors on the 
level of relative efficiency (level effect). However, some authors (Nickell et al., 1992; 
Hernando and Valles, 1 994) point out that these effects might be more persistent over time, 
so they propose to model these persistent effects by including ah additional vector of 
, 
regressors (�) in equation 4, where l.t ::: I. X,h . These additional regressors have been 
h., 
included in some of the estimates in section 6. We shall see (section 3.3) that the model is 
estimated in first differences to avoid the bias derived from the correlation of the individual 
• The most common expression of a production function has as dependent variable the output per employee. In our case, 
this variable has been replaced by the previously defined index. in logarithmic form (log k10). This is equivalent to assuming 
that the original production function has as an additional explanatory variable a sectoral average (as a proxy of the potential 
output) with a coefficient equal to one. However, the same regressions have been carried out taking as a dependent variable 
the output per employee instead of the productivity index and the results have nol been substantially modified. 
7 This set of variables and their theoretical relationship to productivity are detailed in section 4. 
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effects with the regressors. The coefficients of these variables Zit, which in first differences 
are equal to the level of the variables included in the vector X8, will capture the growth 
effect9. 
And second, we will have as dependent variable a profitability measure of the firm. 
In particular, the return on net assets (RAN) will be regressed under the same specification 
than in equation 3. In this case, it cannot be interpreted as an estimation of a production 
function. We allow the capital-labour ratio and labour variable to vary for each sector, as in 
equation 4. 
13 13 n 
RANit =ro+riKPUDITi/+ "'i.Pj(KILh+:LajLi/+ L¢; Xmi/+0i/ 
j::l j::1 m=1 
3.3. ESTIMATION METHOD 
[5] 
To avoid the bias derived from the potential correlation between the individual 
effects and the regressors, the model is estimated in first differences. Moreover, given the 
possible simultaneity of the determining variables of productivity and the dependent 
variable, estimation is carried out by the generalised method of moments (GMM) 10 [Arellano 
and Bond (1991)), using lagged regressors as instruments. To control for sectoral and 
aggregate-related disturbances, sectoral and temporary dummy variables are included in 
the estimation. 
Under the assumption that the error is white noise in the model in levels, when 
estimation is carried out in first differences, an MA(1) structure is imposed in the residual 
term. Therefore, endogenous variables lagged by two or more periods are needed to be 
taken as instruments. For these instruments to be valid, the hypothesis that the error term is 
white noise must hold. If that is the case, the latter will not show second-order serial 
correlation in the equation in first differences. The m2 statistic, which is shown in the tables 
of results, is distributed asymptotically as a normal distribution and is used for testing this 
I I_I 
'"",. IX",. Ix" 
h_1 11_1 
t The letter 0 before the name of a regressor X denotes first difference of the accumulated variable X (OCUOTA, OCONe, 
etc) 
10 At the start of section 6, the results of the OLS (Ordinary Least SQuares) estimation for each year of the sample and for 
the whole period are also presented so they may be compared to the GMM results In first differences. Finally, in section 6.3, 
these results are compared to the GMM estimations in levels and the ones obtained using the system estimator. 
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hypothesis. Lastly, the Sargan test is presented and is used to test for the validity of the 
overidentification restrictions and is distributed asymptotically as a X2. 
4. OTHER DETERMINANTS OF PRODUCTIVITY 
Along with the possible effect of public or private ownership on productivity, this 
paper will empirically test the influence of other factors which have traditionally been 
considered by the theoretical and empirical literature as determinants of efficiency. In 
particular, the influence of the degree of sectoral competition, the existence of financial 
constraints and the role of heterogeneous labour will be analysed. 
The influence on individual productivity of the degree of competition in an sector, is 
first determined by the greater need that firms in competitive sectors have to increase 
efficiency in order to remain in the market (Schmidt, 1996; Aghion and Howitt, 1996). 
Moreover, in a competitive environment, the problems the shareholders face as far as 
controlling managers are reduced as the former have access to mechanisms for comparing 
results (Holmstrom, 1982). Lastly, under competition the price elasticity of demand is 
usually higher, whereby firms have a greater incentive to reduce costs as this brings about 
greater relative benefits. Nonetheless, given that in a monopoly situation the operations of 
the monopolist are usually of a greater volume, the absolute benefit of a reduction in cost is 
also greater (Willig. 1987). 
The variables included in the empirical analysis to approximate the degree of 
competition in the sector are as follows: 
- Sectoral import penetration (PENIMP), as a proxy of the level of foreign 
competition to which the different sectors are exposed. In this respect, the disappearance 
of tariff barriers following EC membership in 1986 produced a strong increase in 
competition in the industrial sector in Spain which might have affected the market structure 
and produclivity of Spanish firms (Hernando and Valles. 1994). 
Nonetheless, some authors (Geroski, 1989) contend that the import penetration 
variable could gather an adverse effect on the efficiency of firms since, given total demand, 
an increase in import penetration may prompt a shift in domestic production without a 
parallel reduction in the stock of capital, thereby causing a decline in capital productivity. 
This negative sign could also be the result of reverse causation, in the sense that the 
sectors with the lowest productivity are those which attract a growing volume of imports 
(Martin Marcos. 1992). 
- Exports as a percentage of sales (XSVTS), a variable which is justified by the 
argument that those firms most dependent on exports are also those with most incentives to 
improve their productivity, given the higher foreign competition. Nonetheless, variables such 
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as labour costs, the exchange rate or foreign prices may alter this relationship (Hernando 
and Valles, 1994). Furthermore, there may be reverse causation: the most efficient firms 
being those with the highest export/sales ratio. 
- Market share (CUOTA). In this case, if market share is regarded as a measure of 
the sector's degree of monopoly, the firms with the largest market share would also be 
those that would be dominant in the market, having less incentive to improve their 
productivity. However, the reverse relationship may also be explained if we believe that the 
most efficient firms are the ones that obtain the largest market share (Demsetz, 1974 and 
Hernando and Valles, 1994). Finally, the positive sign could also be warranted by the 
existence of economies of "learning by doing" associated to accumulated production, that 
would be proxied by the market share. 
- The degree of sectoral concentration (CONC), defined as the market share of the 
three firms with the largest market share in the sectorl1. In this case, there are two kinds of 
arguments explaining the relationship between market share and productivity. First, there is 
the view that it is in the least competitive environments (Le. with most market concentration) 
where firms can benefit to a greater extent from the returns on R+D expenditure since the 
level of uncertainty is lower and cash flow higher. Second, there is the opposite view, that 
the least competitive sectors see the highest red tape costs discouraging technological 
investment (Martin Marcos, 1992) and innovative diffusion. 
The theoretical foundations of the role of financial constraints on the efficiency of 
firms lie on the existence of imperfections in capital markets (non-perfect substitutability) 
which means that the financial position of the firm has consequences for its real variables 
as it affects its capacity to undertake projects or restructuring. The variables that have been 
included in the analysis in an attempt to approximate this role are the following ones: 
- Indebtedness (REND): there is evidence that firms which have been acquired by a 
leveraged buyout have shown higher productivity growth rates since (Lichtenberg and 
Siegel, 1990). Also, Nickell et al. (1992) find a positive relationship between the proportion 
of debt per unit of asset and total productivity (in terms of both level and growth). This is 
justified by the disciplinary effect that an increase in indebtedness has on the use of 
available funds (Nickell et aI., 1996; Jensen, 1986), 
- Interest payments (GINTERES): Nickell (1996) justifies this variable with the 
argument that the higher the level of interest payments in relation to profit levels, the greater 
the likelihood of the firm declaring bankruptcy. 
" Alternatively, the degree of sectoral concentration has been defmed as the maf'p(et share of the four and five firms with the 
largest maf'p(et share in the sector, and the results ha�e not significantly changed .. 
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- Cash-flow (CFK). The argument used for the inclusion of an interest payments 
variable can likewise be used, for the cash-flow variable, but to the opposite effect: the less 
cash-flow available to managers, the greater the likelihood of the firm declaring bankruptcy 
and the greater the pressure on management. 
Nonetheless, the existence of asymmetrical information (for instance, because the 
retum on investment projects cannot be fully observed by the lender) may be the source of 
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), in such a way that firms are mostly dependent on 
their ability to generate funds to undertake their investment projects. Even though there may 
be no rationing, if the cost of self-financing is lower than the cost of equity, the cash-flow 
variable will also be relevant. In this case, however, the relationship between the variable 
and productivity is in the opposite direction to the previous case: given a level of debt, more 
available resources allow more investment opportunities, increasing the firm's productivity. 
- Presence of financial institutions in the firm's capital (INSFIN): as a measure of the 
firm's ability to gain access to sources of financing, and following the arguments above , the 
greater the access (proxied by the fact that financial institutions have a share), the lesser 
the pressure on management. However, if there is credit rationing, the greater the access to 
sources of financing, the greater the possibility of benefiting from all the investment 
opportunities that may arise for the firm. 
Some authors point out that there could be a certain degree of substitutability 
between competition and financial pressure and that the positive effect of competition on 
productivity might be expected to be greater when interest payments are low (Nickell et aI., 
1996). 
As regards to the quality of labour, the following variables have been defined 
- The proportion of temporary to total employment in the firm (TEMP). Temporary 
employment has a considerable tradition in the literature as a relevant variable for labour 
productivity. In Spain, the emergence of temporary contracts as from 1984 may have 
prompted an important reduction in labour productivity (Jimeno and Toharia, 1991). 
Nonetheless, the expected effect of this variable on productivity may be twofold. First, the 
incentives for the firm to earmark resources to investment in human capital are greater in 
the case of a working relationship unlimited by time. On the other hand, temporary labour 
might provide a firm with substantial flexibility and better adaptability to changes in its 
environment. Furthermore, it could be argued that temporary workers have an incentive to 
make a greater effort with the aim of becoming permanent. 
- Labour costs per employee (CaSTEL), which may be an indicator of the quality of 
labour provided if there is a direct relationship between remuneration and the degree of 
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professional expertise. However, this variable may be influenced by the presence of 
greater/lesser trade union power, among other factors. 
5. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
The data source is a sample of manufacturing firms that have co-operated with the 
Banco de Espana Central Balance Sheet Office (CBBE) for at least four consecutive years, 
in the period 1 983-199612. It should be borne in mind that reporting to CBBE is voluntary. In 
the case of the manufacturing sector, however, the coverage of the CSBE sample in terms 
of gross value added at factor cost is estimated to have reached 33% of all firms in the 
sector according to 1993 National Accounts information. Nonetheless, the sample shows 
certain biases: large, public firms with a high proportion of permanent staff predominate. 
This section is devoted to highlighting the main productivity trends of the firms in the 
sample and to identifying the main differential characteristics between public and private 
firms. 
Firstly, in Table 1, the median, mean and standard deviation of the previously 
defined efficiency index for the whole period under analysis (1983-1996) is presented. A 
comparison between public and private firms is included, where a firm is considered within 
the group of state-owned corporations if the public sector holds any proportion of the 
corporation's capital stock. The table shows that in the early years of the sample (1983-
1986) the median of this efficiency index was higher in private corporations, although the 
difference with public firms is not statistically significant. From 1 986 onwards public firms 
show, in median, a higher index than private corporations, and the difference is statistically 
significant. Note, however, that in these calculations other potential determinants of 
business efficiency are not taken into account. Nonetheless, as can be seen in Table 2, the 
sectoral and time differences in this index are high. In four of the thirteen sectors, the 
differences in the index between private and public firms are not statistically significant. In 
six sectors, the median of the index is higher and statistically significant in some periods in 
state-owned firms (in basic metals and manufactured metal products, the difference in the 
index is statistically Significant in 12 over 14 years). Finally, private firms show higher 
indexes than public firms, the difference being statistically significant in some periods, in 
four sectors (in transport equipment, the difference in the index is statistically significant in 9 
over 14 years). 
Secondly, Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics of certain variables whose 
relevance in explaining productivity we discussed, distinguishing between public and private 
firms. The following conclusions may be drawn from this table. 
\l A detailed description of the characteristics of the sample used can be found in the Appendix. 
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As regards the use of productive inputs, public corporations have a greater number 
of employees (PERS) and a higher capital/labour ratio (KlL), in tenms of medians, 
throughout the period considered. The volume of the stock of capital (SKR) is also higher in 
public corporations, whereupon their size may be said to be greater. Further, they have a 
lower percentage of temporary employees (TEMP) and higher labour costs (COSTEl). 
The growth rates of activity (RVTAS, RVAB, REXP, RIMP) are generally higher in 
private corporations. In particular, public corporations grow less in upturns and yet still lag 
behind in recessionary phases, which seem to last longer than in the case of private 
corporations. Moreover, the financial ratios highlight one of the traditional problems of public 
corporations, namely overstaffing, whereby for virtually the entire period these ratios show 
negative rates of change in the number of employees (RPERS), indicating a possible 
ongoing adjustment thereof. 
Public corporations have a bigger market share (CUOTA), in median terms, than 
their private counterparts throughout the period considered. At the same time, they assign a 
higher proportion of their sales to exports (XSVTS). 
Public corporations have a higher debt ratio (REND) than private firms, while self­
financing (AUTOFIN) is higher in the latter. 
In terms of profitability, public firms have a lower gross economic return (REB) (Le. 
after deducting personnel costs from value added) than that of private corporations owing to 
the fact that personnel costs (GP) account for a higher proportion of value added in public 
corporations. Moreover, the funds generated (RG) are also greater in private firms, as is the 
return on net assets (RAN) and the return on equity (RRP). 
Generally, therefore, public enterprises may be said to show better results when 
value added is observed; however, once personnel costs, financial charges and 
depreciation are taken into account, their profitability ratios are far lower than those of 
private corporations, as a result of a higher number of employees and higher labour costs, 
greater indebtedness and a larger capital stock. 
lastly, Table 4 shows the medians of the sectoral variables of import penetration 
and of concentration, so as to characterise the degree of competition of the various sectors. 
This table also presents the number of public and private corporations included in each of 
the years and sectors of the sample. Generally, strong growth in import penetration is seen 
in all sectors, which would be an indication of the increase in the degree of competition: this 
variable stood at below 10% in seven of the sectors analysed in 1983, whereas in 1996 only 
two sectors (the food, beverages and tobacco industry and the non-metallic mineral 
products sector) were below 20%. Import penetration has been particularly high throughout 
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the period in construction and mechanical equipment, in electrical, electronic and optical 
materials and equipment, and in the chemical sector. As to the degree of concentration, this 
variable has generally declined during the period except in the chemical and textile and 
clothing industries. The other non-metallic mineral products and transport equipment 
industries have been among the most concentrated sectors both at the beginning and end 
of the period, while the paper and other manufacturing industries display low concentration 
ratios. In general, there is no clear relationship between the degree of concentration and 
import penetration except in the case of the other non-metallic mineral products sector 
which, as already stated, shows high concentration and a low weight in terms of import 
penetration. 
6. RESULTS 
This section details the results of the estimation of the equations presented in 
section 3, with the method set out in section 3.3. First of aU, however, Tables 5 and 6 show 
the results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations of the equations of the relative 
productivity index and profitability, respectively, for each of the years of the sample and for 
the whole period'3. Whatever the definition of efficiency adopted, the results show a 
negative and significant coefficient of the public ownership variable (KPUDIT), which would 
denote that public ownership has a negative effect on efficiency. These results coincide with 
those obtained by Argimon, Artola and Gonzalez-Paramo (1999) in the case of the 
productivity index for aU sectors of the Banco de Espana Central Balance Sheet Office in 
1994. 
As regards the financial variables, the coefficient is statistically significant in aU 
annual regressions, the sign being positive in the case of cash flow per capital stock and 
negative in the case of indebtedness. Both signs are against the argument of the 
disciplining effect discussed in section 4, but, in the case of cash flow, it is coherent with the 
theory that, if there is asymmetrical information, firms are more dependent on their ability to 
generate funds to undertake their investment projects. Thus, more available resources allow 
investment opportunities to rise increasing the firm's productivity. 
None of the variables proposed to approximate the competitive framework and the 
market structure are statistically significant in all and each year. The results for the period 
as a whole in Table 5 (column 15) show that exports, import penetration, market share and 
concentration positively and significantly affect productivity, which leads us to contradictory 
interpretations: the positive sign of the coefficients of the first two variables would be in 
accordance with the argument that a greater degree of competition leads to corporate 
efficiency, while a positive sign for the coefficients of the last two variables (market share 
and concentration) would denote the oppOSite. In the case of Table 6, which presents the 
11 All the panel estimations have been obtained using the DPD96 program by Arellano and Bond (1996). 
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results of the regressions in which profitability is the variable to be explained, only the 
concentration variable shows a significant coefficient. Its negative sign denotes that 
competition adversely affects business profitability. 
Finally, the results show that, when the dependent variable is the relative efficiency 
index (Table 5), the temporary employment ratio and personnel costs per employee have a 
positive impact, while the percentage of subsidies'· received has a negative non-statistically 
significant impact. When the dependent variable is profitability (Table 6), the previous 
results hold, except in the case of the personnel costs variable, which shows a negative 
coefficient. Nonetheless, these results do not hold for all the annual regressions. 
The results presented in Tables 5 and 6 are obtained by OlS, so that they have not 
considered the possible simultaneity of the determining variables of productivity and the 
dependent variable, nor have they (except in the last two columns) addressed the possible 
correlation between the individual effects and the regressors'5. In fact, the values of the 
first and second order serial correlation test statistics (M1 and M2 values in column 1 5  of 
Tables 5 and 6) may reflect the presence of firm specific effects. If these firm specific effects 
were correlated with the regressors, we would expect that OlS estimates in first-differences 
or orthogonal deviations would not be biased (Arellano and Baver, 1 995), while OlS 
estimates in levels would. Columns 16 and 17 in Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the 
OlS estimations in first-differences and orthogonal deviations. The values of the first and 
second order serial correlation test statistics cannot reject the presence of first-order serial 
correlation in the transitory errors of the original model in levels. Moreover, the fact that the 
values of the coefficients in the estimations in first-differences and levels differ could be 
explained by the bias in the OlS levels estimate resulting from the correlation between the 
individual effects and the regressors. However, the values of the coefficients in the 
estimations in first-differences and orthogonal deviations also differ, so that the correlation 
between the individual effects and the regressors cannot be the only explanation of the 
difference with the level estimation. OlS estimates in first differences and orthogonal 
deviations can also be biased, for example, due to the presence of endogenous variables. 
For this reason, the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation is used. 
6.1. OWNERSHIP AND RELATIVE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
Table 7 presents the results of the regression analysis where the dependent variable 
is the relative productivity index, defined in section 3.1 (logk10), and where the regressors 
are relative public ownership, the capitalllabour ratio by sector and employment by sector, 
and another set of potential determining factors of productivity (see equation 4). 
1. The ratio subsidies over ouput has been included as an additional regressor to control for their distortionnary effects on 
prices. 
IS All the arguments included in this paragraph are based on Bover and Watson (2000) 
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Relative public ownership is defined in four different ways, First, the variable 
KPUDIT is defined as the percentage of the capital stock which is publicly owned, Second, 
the variable KPU is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the public sector has a 
share in the firm's capital stock and 0 otherwise, Third, KPUBCB is also a dummy variable 
which takes the value one if the public sector has more than 50% of the firm's capital stock 
and/or if, whatever the share, it has control of the firm16, Finally, KPU1,OO is a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the public sector holds 100% of the firm's capital 
stock17and 0 otherwise. 
The results in Table 7 are based on a different assumption as regards the 
endogeneity of the relative public ownership variable. In the estimations whose results are 
shown in columns 1 to 8, this variable is considered as exogenous while in the case of 
columns 9 to 12 it is considered endogenous18. In principle, the relative public ownership 
variable could be regarded as exogenous in relation to the productivity measure. However, 
given that, in the Spanish case, the corporate public-sector has often been the recipient of 
unprofitable or ailing firms (so that it is regarded as a "hospital for firms") (Cuervo, 1997) 
and, therefore, that the decision to nationalise a corporation has not been independent of its 
productivity or profitability, it seems relevant to also consider it an endogenous variable. 
The first four columns show the results of the estimations of equation 4 for each of 
the definitions of the relative public ownership variable, including sectoral and time dummies 
and a different coefficient per sector for the capital/labour ratio, and for labour. The other 
potential determinants of productivity are included in the estimations whose results are 
given in columns 5 to 12, where only the coefficients of those that are statistically Significant 
are presented. All estimations are in first-differences. 
The results show that public/private ownership is not a determinant of relative 
apparent labour productivity since its coefficient is never significant, irrespective of the 
definition of relative public ownership chosen. Moreover, the sign of this variable is negative 
" This variable has been taken directly from the infOlmation provided by the Banco de Espana Central Balance Sheet 
OffICe. 
17 Tests have been carried out, both for the relative efficiency index and the profitability Index, in which the variables KPU 
and KPUOIT have been jointly included, and where also a square tenTI (KPUOIT� ) has been added, with similar results 10 the 
ones presented in the tables. Alternatively, dummy variables indicative of whether the public share in the capital is at most 
50%, if the share exceeds 50% but is lower than 80% and if the share is greater Ihan Of equal to 80% have been introduced in 
order to characterise the behaviour of the mixed corporation, and their coefficients have not been found to be statistically 
significant. 
II Given that the relative public ownership variables presents little time variation, their lags cannot be considered good 
instruments. Therefore, we instrument this variable with the lags of some other regressors that. according to section 5, are 
highly correlated with the relative public ownership variable, for example, the capital/labour ratio, employment or indebtedness. 
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when it is treated as an exogenous variable, which would denote that public ownership 
adversely affects efficiency Ii. 
As regards the variables that attempt to proxy the degree of competition, the import 
penetration coefficient (PEN IMP) is positive and significant, indicating that foreign 
competition has a favourable effect on the level of productivity. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of the variable representing the proportion of exports (XSVTS) is not found to be 
significant. Moreover, a positive and significant sign is obtained for the growth effect of the 
market share (DCUOTA) in consonance with our hypothesis that this variable may be an 
indicator of the accumulated output and there are economies of "learning by doing". In 
respect to concentration, a negative and significant coefficient of the growth effect is found 
(DCONC). As indicated in section 4, this could be explained by the fact that it is in the least 
competitive (most concentrated) sectors where there are fewest incentives for technological 
investment or where there is a lesser diffusion thereof. 
As for the variables that proxy the degree of financial constraint, the coefficient of the 
cash-flow per unit of capital variable (CFK) has a positive and significant sign. This is 
compatible with the argument based on the existence of asymmetrical information ,  which 
points out that, in a credit rationing situation, corporations are more dependent on their 
ability to generate funds so as to be in a position to benefit from investment opportunities 
and, therefore, to increase productivity. The debt and interest payments ratios, however, are 
not significant. 
Among the labour market variables, the labour costs per employee (COSTEL) 
shows a negative and significant coefficient. If this is taken as an indicator of the quality of 
work, it is contrary to the starting hypothesis that greater quality is associated with greater 
productivity. However, this variable may be influenced by the presence, for example, of 
trade union power. On the other hand, no evidence is found that the proportion of temporary 
employment is a determinant of efficiency. 
Finally, as regards returns to scale, which is tested using the coefficient of the 
number of employees (whose results are not shown in the tables), the hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale cannot be rejected in nine sectors (food, beverag7s and tobacco: 
other non-metallic mineral products; construction of machinery and mechanical equipment: 
electrical, electronic and optical materials and equipment: transport equipment; textiles: 
timber and cork; paper; and other manufacturing). Diminishing returns are found in two 
sectors (chemicals and basic metals). And, finally, increasing returns are obtained in two 
sectors (leather and rubber processing). 
10 Given that the argument that the corporate public-sector has been recipient for unprofitable or ailing companies is not 
applicable to the whole period considered in this paper, the sample has also been divided Into two suirperiods, 1990 being the 
break point year, and the above estimations were repeated. Results do not vary significantly. 
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6.2. OWNERSHIP AND PROFITABILITY 
Lastly, Table 8 shows the results of the estimation of equation 5 (see section 3.2), 
i.e. when the dependent variable is business profitability. As in the previous case, the 
results of columns 1 to 8 are obtained under the hypothesis that the public/private 
ownership variables are exogenous, while in the case of columns 9 to 12  they are 
considered to be endogenous. At the same time, the first four columns of each table give 
the results of the estimation of equation 5 for each of the definitions of the relative public 
ownership variable, including sectoral and time dummies and with a different coefficient per 
sector for capital and for labour. The other potential determinants of productivity, are also 
included in columns 5-12, although their coefficient is recorded only if it is statistically 
significant. 
The results show that the coefficients of the relative public ownership variables are 
not significant for this definition of productivity either, although the sign is still negative20. In 
this case, the coefficients of the variables of cash-flow per unit of capital and of 
indebtedness are statistically significant (the first with a positive and the second with a 
negative sign), highlighting once again the importance of financial position in determining 
profitability. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that the relationships between the two 
former variables and profitability may be highly influenced by a purely accounting 
dependence: the cash-flow variable is an important part of the firm's final profits and, 
likewise, greater debt entails higher interest payments which reduce profits. A positive and 
significant relationship is also found between the market share (level and growth effect) and 
profitability, indicating that firms with a larger market share obtain larger profits. There is a 
negative and significant relationship between the labour costs per employee and profit 
variables, leading to the same interpretation as in section 6.1. 
6.3. DIFFERENT METHODS OF ESTIMATION 
The results presented so far are affected by the lack of variation in some of the 
variables. as the estimation is carried out in first differences. It becomes difficult to assess 
whether the lack of statistical significance in these variables arises because of their 
temporal constancy or because of a Mgenuine" lack of relevance. The relative public 
ownership is one of these variables as it presents time variation only in 311  observations in 
the case of KPU. in 552 in the case of KPUDIT, in 199 in the case of KPUBCB and, lastly, in 
155 in the case of KPU100. However, it should be taken into account that the loss of 
statistical significance in the estimation in first differences might also be explained the 
potential biases due to the correlation of the individual effects with the regressors and the 
10 As in the case of the relative productivity, the sample has been divided into two sub-periods as well, 1990 being the break 
point year, and the above estimations were repeated. Results do not vary significantly for each sub-period. 
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simultaneity between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable in the estimation 
in levels. 
This problem of the scarcity of time variation can be addressed if it is �ssumed that 
some of the regressors have a constant correlation with the fixed effects, which only 
requires stationarity in mean of the regressors, given the effects21. Arellano and Bover 
(1995) show that, in this case, the first differences of the variables are appropriate 
instruments for the equations in levels. Accordingly, in addition to the instruments in levels 
for the equations in first differences, they propose using the instruments in first differences 
for the equations in levels. This model of first differences and levels, which they call system 
estimator, is half-way between the fixed effects model, in which all the explanatory variables 
are potentially correlated with the effects, and the random effects model, in which no 
variable is. In this paper we have also applied this procedure and the generalised method of 
moments (GMM) with variables in levels. In this latter case, bias derived from the potential 
simultaneity between the regressors and the dependent variable is avoided but not the one 
derived from the correlation between the fixed effects and the regressors. 
Tables 9 and 10 show the results of these estimations when the dependent variables 
are the productivity index and business profitability, respectively. In both cases, GMM 
estimates in levels and by the system estimator are biased since the validity of the 
overidentification restrictions is rejected and it is found first order and second order 
correlation. Nevertheless, in the first case (table 9), the coefficients of the public/private 
ownership variables are always negative but never significant, except for the variable 
KPU100 in the GMM estimation in levels. This might indicate that the loss of significance of 
the coefficients of these variables is not due to the scarcity of time variation but to the bias 
introduced by the simultaneity of some of the regressors with the dependent variable in the 
OLS estimates in levels. As regards the estimates when the dependent variable is business 
profitability (Table 10), again, the sign of the coefficients of the relative public ownership 
variables is always negative, but now they are also significant in the GMM estimations in 
levels and, in the case of the variable KPU, also under the system estimator. In this case, it 
is not possible to know whether the loss of significance of the ownership variables is due to 
the scarcity of time variation of these variables or to the bias derived from the correlation of 
the fixed effects with the regressors in the estimations in levels. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Efficiency enhancement is one of the most commonly used arguments to justify 
privatisation. Public firms' performance is assumed to be poorer than private firms' and 
21 Alternatively. the problem of the scarcity of time variation in the publicJprivate ownership variable in the estimations in first· 
differences has been treated by introducing among the regressors new variables generated by multiplying some regressor with 
the publiC/private ownership variable. However. the coefficients of these variables were not statistically significant. 
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therefore, the privatisation of the former is expected to increase global efficiency. From a 
theoretical standpoint, however, the relationship between public ownership and efficiency 
requires identification of the competitive framework in which· the firm operates. Private 
enterprises are generally acknowledged to be more efficient than their public counterparts in 
competitive markets, while the results of the comparison are not conclusive in the case of 
non-competitive or regulated sectors. 
This paper has empirically tested, for the Spanish case, the hypothesis that public 
ownership is a determinant of a firm's performance. The comparison between public and 
private enterprises in terms of efficiency may be inappropriate as public firms may have 
objectives not related to profit maximisation. Accordingly, in this paper performance has 
been measured in two alternative ways: relative productivity and profitability. The first 
definition aims at proxying the concept of technical or productive efficiency, which is 
generally taken to be the sole objective that public enterprises cannot elude, while the 
second one proxies allocative efficiency. Moreover, the role of ownership as regards a firm's 
performance is isolated, by conditioning on other possible determinants of efficiency, in 
particular, the degree of competition, the firm's financial situation or the heterogeneity of 
labour. 
The evidence gathered here show that public ownership has a negative effect on 
efficiency, proxied by a labour productivity index, but it is not statistically significant. This 
lack of statistical significance contrasts with the results obtained in Argimon, Artola and 
Gonzalez-Paramo (1 999) with data for 1994. In fact, annual estimations for the whole period 
presented here also find a negative statistically significant coefficient for the public 
ownership variable. Two factors may account for these seemingly conflicting results: on the 
one hand, annual estimations may be biased by the possible Simultaneity of the variables, 
and on the other, the lack of time variation of the variable that captures ownership might 
explain this lack of significance in the estimation in first-differences. The tests carried out 
here, although not conclusive, seem to favour the first of these explanations. 
On the other hand, a significant relationship is found between some of the variables 
attempting to approximate the degree of competition (in particular, import penetration and 
the degree of concentration) and relative productivity, showing that competition positively 
affects efficiency. In addition, a positive and Significant relationship is found for the growth 
effect of market share, that jf this variable is considered an indicator of the accumulated 
output, it would favour the hypothesis trlat there are economies of "learning by doing". As 
for the variables that proxy the degree of financial constraint, the coefficient of the cash-flow 
per unit of capital has a positive and significant sign. This is consistent with the argument 
based on the existence of asymmetric information, which indicates that, given a situation of 
credit rationing, enterprises are more dependent on their ability to generate funds with the 
aim of taking advantage of investment opportunities and, therefore, increasing corporate 
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productivity. Finally, the input variables show that higher capital resources increase the 
productivity of a given quantity of labour. On the other hand, higher labour costs per 
employee are associated with lower productivity, so that either this variable is not a good 
proxy for labour quality or, if it is, higher quality does not lea·d to greater productivity. 
The estimated relationship between public ownership and profitability is always 
negative. The estimated coefficient is moreover statistically significant in many of the 
estimates, so that public ownership has a negative effect on the profitability of a firm. 
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Tabl.'.EFFlCIENCY INDEX AND OWNERSHIP IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
40.3 
48.5 42.8 44.1 41.9 39.3 36.3 37.7 41.8 43.8 
Deviation 36.7 27.3 26.8 25.8 28.2 29.2 28.1 32.8 27.2 
44.2 39.6 43.1 36.6 42.2 " 38 48.5 47.1 
25.9 25.1 23.1 19.9 47.5 n.2 24.8 60.3 43.2 
48.7 " "., 42.2 39.2 36 37.7 41.7 "3.7 
37.2 27.4 26.' 26 21.' 26.2 28.2 31.9 26.7 
putIk. .,  .�uion_ ............. io 
r'''-..rryio�p.4>Iic:if....,. �ol''' �·. caPtIII .. ",*io�. 
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T hi 2 PROOUCInVlTY INDEX (K101 AND OWNERSHIP BY SECTORS (MEDIANS) • • 
"., .... " .. " .. "" " .. 11189 .... 1991 .", ... , . ... "" " .. 
I. FCXXl. BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS 
"'OJ, 32.3 37.7 36.5 33.1 " .. « .• 45.3 51.6 45.4 36.' 40.3 32.4 29.' 35.3 
'''''''' 35.7 38.8 37.9 37.3 31 .2 29.' 30.7 32.5 ".7 31 .2 " .. 31 .6 30 33.6 
2. OUElotCALS 
"""" 31.3 24.8 ZT 28.9 ,.., ".7 Z7.' 33.5 42.9 37.8 43.3 .. .. , S27 
-'" 36.4 24.8 25.4 27.6 23.4 19.6 23.5 35.2 46.6 41 .8 40.1 32.9 23.3 32.3 
3 . OTHER NDN-METALUC MINERAL PROOUCTS 
""'" 35.2 .. 37.8 " , ... 18.9 9.' 29.3 
-'" 32.3 35.5 30.' 26.7 25.8 21 .4 20.' " 22.' 2 6 .  28.9 22 20.9 23.1 
. &UIC METALS ANO fASRICATEO METAL PROCIIJCTS 
"'OJ' 25.5 25.3 40.5 41.5 .. , 25.1 21.5 30.3 .... " .• .... 31.9 " 41.3 
""'." 17.7 18.5 " " . . 27.6 17.5 19.3 28 37.9 49.8 " . • 27.4 16.5 31.5 
S. MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 
"''''  ...  62.7 ".5 50.' 49.8 ".7 46.7 45.7 49.1 35.8 45.8 " 45.4 18.3 
_." 65.4 57.9 49.2 55 49.2 46.1 ,<.7 52.9 56.' 51.4 43.1 55.' 57.' ... , 
l. El.E.CTlaCAl., E1..EC"mONIC AND OPTIMAl... EQUIPMENT AND INSlRUMENTlI 
"''''' 30.6 28.5 23.4 23.8 30.3 28.6 36.9 32.8 , ..  31.3 33.8 46.' 
-'" 31 .7 25.2 203 24.7 25.5 25.2 25.5 28.6 28.4 31.6 28.3 31 .3 36.' 32.5 
7 . TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
"''''  59.3 48.8 ... , 40.5 40.9 46.3 43.9 « .• 45.& 53.2 " 26.' 30.' 39.2 
_." 74.9 " 62.1 50.' SO 47.1 SO . , 51.6 m 56.' 53.4 ... ... , 52.5 
,. TEXTILES ANO CLOlMNG 
"''''' 33.5 21.5 40.7 " 46.9 42.3 41 .5 62.7 42.5 69.2 78.9 78.8 69.8 
_." 53.9 .... 51 .8 40.6 43.2 43.7 " 49.1 « . • 46.7 44.6 46.5 49.1 " 
t . l.EA"niER AND FOO"I"YEAA INOUSlRY 
""'" 22.' 17.8 20.' ,<.6 14.3 11.1 7.' 
-'" 35.4 32.8 33.2 41.4 " .. 35.2 32.3 43.8 46.1 46.4 49.3 53.8 52.2 .. 
10. WOO AND CORK INDUS"TRY 
MU' 25.7 24.6 1 8.8 1 9.1 23.4 24.9 30.1 24.3 13.7 24.4 17.6 19.8 27.8 
-'" 33.2 " " 25.2 25.4 30.' 27.2 33.4 " .. 25.7 27.5 28.9 24.8 35.6 
11. PULP. PAPeR. ETC 
"''''  39.9 33.4 SO., 42.7 35.1 33.1 32.7 " 22.' ".7 " 53.7 35.2 25.9 
""'." 38.1 27.3 " 36.1 " .  27.6 24.8 24.5 24.9 22.9 26.4 25.2 15.7 23.4 
12. RUBBVi. ANO PLASl1C PROOUCTlI 
"'''', 88.9 87.9 70.5 61.7 59.4 63.4 76.4 70.2 83.7 62.5 39.9 48.2 
""'." 86.6 70.8 68.' 55.8 55.6 46.8 47.9 48.3 47.7 .. 40.9 45.8 .. 48.8 
11. OTHER MANUF,t.Cl1JRING INOUSlNES 
eu"" 26.6 
PRIVATE 48.6 " 44.3 31.9 28.6 30 39.1 40.4 41.6 36 38.6 " . . 30.6 38.1 
Val ... ,in _"'di""ltlNll � ; ' si ·fic.lnl ..... �nlol.d � 111 .. 1 ... . 111 . ... 81 ... 01 \ � ON !lon', "" "tal rIOd< if , 
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Table 3. DETERMINANTS OF EFFICIENCY AND OWNERSHIP 
MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
Me<fans , 
1983 1984 198$ 1986 
1. ACTIVITY 
OVTAS Private 13.8 13.9 'A 
Public 11.9 10.6 0.' 
DVAS Private 10.4 12.4 13.7 
Public 10.7 , . . , 
om Private 21.6 11.7 '.2 
Public " .• '.7 -79 
m.F Private 79 
Public A 
OPERS Privete _0.3 0 0 
Public -1 .9 �.7 0 
2. t NPUTS 
'KR Private '" 79. '" ". 
Pub�c '" '" 1113 1089 
KC Private ,., 2.' 2.2 2.' 
Public; '.3 '.0 '-' 3.' 
FERS Private ". .... " " 
Public; ." 290 '" '" 
COSTEl Private " '.7 , .  " 
Public 7.8 '-' 2.' 2.' 
TEMP Private 0 0 0 0.' 
Public 0.' ,. " '0 
3. COMPETITION 
XSVOS Private .. , ' 0 , . ' 2  
Public , . •. , '.0 •. , 
CUOTA Private 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.03 
Public 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.10 
4. FINANCIAL POSITION ANO PROFITABILITY 
RENO Private 21 .6 27.6 27.4 25.9 
Public 43.2 ,,-, 42.2 36.7 
AUTOFIN Private " 15.0 17.2 18.6 
Public; '.0 10.5 10.7 13.9 
RE. Plivate 10.5 10.2 10.5 11.04 
Public 10.1 10.0 •. , '.7 
OF Private 69.7 "A '" ".7 
Public; 71.1 ... , ... , 72.5 
CFK Private 25.7 25.2 " .. 30.8 
Public; .. 10.0 12.1 10.4 
RO Private ... ... ,., ._, 
Public " , .• '.0 '.1 
RAN Private 11.5 11.6 11.7 13.7 
Public; ... 7.' • •  " 
RRF Private , .• • •  • •  14.3 
Public '-' .. , ... , _. 
1 987 " .. 
10.7 10.7 
" 14.3 
11.0 .. , 
• •  14.5 
7 11.3 
-6.6 16.0 
17.6 13.1 
'.9 " 
o. " 
_1.2 0 
' " no 
'" 1099 
2.' 2 2  
'.0 <9 
" " 
215 '" 
' 0  2 2  
2.' 2.9 
2.' '-' 
2.' '.9 
, . ,. 
'.9 7.' 
0.02 0.02 
0.1 3  0.12 
23.6 21 .5 
37.4 32.2 
11.5 17.8 
13.3 18.0 
10.6 10.3 
'-' , .  
65.1 65.6 
68.0 67.6 
30.6 28.3 
11 .9 16.2 
'.7 ..  
••  •. , 
15.3 15.5 
7.' '.7 
16.7 17.2 
• •  89 
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1989 1990 1991 "" 1993 1994 1995 "" 
1 1.6 '.7 , . 0.5 _ 1 .6 13.9 10 7  ... 
••• 2.' � .• .2.7 ,. 17.5 17.6 -2.6 
1 0.9 . 2  '.7 2.9 ·0.9 9.7 7.' .. , 
' 7  •. , -9.9 -3.4 ·1.4 . .. 13.1 _5.1 
'.7 2.' -2.3 7 15.9 29.' 17.5 '.7 
1 2.3 A.' � ,  _4.3 7.' 15.3 " 0  , .. 
15.1 , .. -3.7 '-' ,. 19.6 13.9 '.7 
7 '  '.7 -10.5 -5.5 � .• -1.6 10.9 18.8 
0 0 0 -0.8 -2.9 0 0 0 
0. ' � .• �.2 -3.0 -4.2 -3.7 -1 .6 -2.4 
H. m "2 ". ' " '" 770 >e. 
"'2 2337 1726 1998 19901 1820 2117 2137 
2 '  ,. 2.7 2.' " " , .• '-' 
.., '.3 '-' ... 7 •. , '.0 7.' 
57 57 .. " " " .. " 
m '" 3" '" ". '" '" ". 
2 '  27 2 9  ' 2  " , .• " 3.7 
'-' 3.7 '-' '.3 '.7 ..• '.2 ., 
... T.' ... 11.1 10.3 11.4 13.0 12.5 
'.2 ..• •. , .. , 2.' 2 '  2 0 ,. 
, .• ,. 0 ,. 2. ' '.0 ••• '.2 
10.1 , .  9.9 12.0 16.8 12.2 13.9 22.9 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.D2 0.02 0.02 0.D2 
0.10 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.13 
21 .2 21 .7 21 .9 23.9 24.2 22.1 20 ' 19.3 
28.7 ,,-, 37.7 'U 31.6 28.4 23.2 15.0 
17.1 15.7 TO' T<' '" 11.6 19.5 20 
H.6 '.2 _1.8 _11.4 _1 .9 ' 0  15.3 11.9 
10.1 '.7 " '.2 '.7 9.' '.7 , .. 
'.0 7.' • •  " 2 '  . 2  •.. •. , 
".7 "., 67.9 70.7 71.4 "., ".7 67.2 
77.7 79.' 81.8 89.S 89.9 ".7 71.4 78.2 
26.7 22.6 21.4 16.7 " 18.8 19.1 18.7 
13.7 , .  0.' A -0.5 .. , 12.1 • .7 
, ... '.7 .. , '.7 .. , , .• ._ . 
, .• '.0 �.2 -2.4 -0.8 2.7 ..• .., 
15.6 14.6 13.7 11.1 ,., 11.5 12.1 11.3 
9 '  7A '.7 -1.6 0.' 2.' '.0 , .• 
16.2 13.2 " .8 8.' , .  10.7 12.0 11.1 
11.7 .. , ' -' -5.6 0.0 0.' 13.6 .. , 
Table 4.DEGREE OF SECTORAL COMPETITION 
8.2 8.0 7.3 7.1 6.0 
207 272 364 451 516 
195 257 351 437 503 
6.3 6.1 9.1 
276 313 332 
268 305 323 
18.8 17.1 16.6 15.5 16.0 
99 129 152 179 197 
96 125 148 174 192 
11.4 11.8 1 1 . 1  11.8 10.6 
1 1 9  170 205 257 291 
105 155 189 239 275 
18.8 20.5 20.3 20.7 18.3 
71 90 1 1 3  131 145 
59 77 102 1 1 8  134 
12 13 11 13 1 1  
6.2 6.1 
534 520 
521 509 
11 .7 11 .0 
329 315 
319 304 
14.9 12.5 
196 192 
191 189 
1 1 .4 11 .0 
288 296 
271 277 
18.3 20.1 
143 141 
133 132 
10 9 
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6.2 6.4 
491 469 
482 460 
7.3 9.2 
305 297 
295 290 
12.5 12.0 
188 185 
187 185 
10.4 9.3 
287 264 
269 245 
19.3 20.4 
136 1 1 8  
128 1 1 1  
8 7 
6.1 
460 
450 
4.9 
291 
283 
10.6 
184 
184 
8.6 
244 
225 
16.9 
116 
109 
7 
5.6 5.4 
453 417 
442 406 
6.0 6.5 
276 247 
272 243 
10.9 1 1 .4 
176 169 
176 169 
9.1 8.6 
252 230 
228 209 
17.7 16.9 
1 1 3  106 
106 98 
7 8 
5.6 
384 
375 
7.0 
230 
226 
12.8 
163 
163 
7.3 
215 
197 
16.1 
102 
93 
9 
117 
108 
16.6 17.7 16.0 17.6 13.6 1 1 .4 12.1 12.0 12.4 
71 90 1 1 1  121 136 126 121 1 1 9  
69 66 106 1 1 6  127 120 1 1 6  
2 4 3 6 1 1 1 
The varitlble, are defined in lila Appendix 
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I �:::' .::" 
I��� ,.�!� :�:� �;� '�;f �;f : ::� 
I ?;'l:, ,'::\ � ,,;,:\ '::\ ,,:, 
i';" I ?i':, ',';,' i'� 
� . 
I �;',',', I �;';;, O,"� I ?;';i, 
m=. I IlUL L�j'.' I��, 
The vari.bles lie del\ll8d in II-.. Ippandix. 
NUI'I'Ibfi of obsetvI�: 27023. N..-n,* of f>n'n$: ]889. 
First drtferences estimates. Estimltion method: genef1l!ised method of moments. lneh.ldtcl IS instruments.re the regreuor1 
conaidered endogellOUa .nd �nt in eaell estimate taggtcl by two 100 lllre-!! periods (CONe and PENtMP are considered 
e�ogellOUl variables). First ... tep estimates. �roskedlSticlty..f"Obust. 
Temporary.nd Hdorat dl.WOOlY variables hI .... been Included in aU II-.. r.gressions H regreuors and instruments. 
The t-statislics are indicated in brackets. 
T5 indudes the p-vlhles ,..� to the 51rgan test. and mt iOnd m2 II-.. p-values relating to the mt· and second-orde, 
correl"ion tests. 
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The variables are clefined in the appendilL 
Number of ob$elVllltionS: 2036&. Nl.IITIber of fums: 38a9. 
Firs! differences estimate.. Estimation method: gener;lliMd metnod Of moments. Indvded as Instruments are the regrellOfa 
consi<l.red endogenoos aod present In each estimate lagged by !We and three periods (CONe and PENIMP are con,i<lered 
exogenou, variables)_ Fil$t-step estimates, heteros.kediSticity-robust 
TtmponllY and sectoral durrmy variables kaYe bHn induded in aH the regressiont u legressors and instruments. 
The 1-st;IIistic;$ are indir;aled in braekets. 
TS ineI\Ide$ the t>Yatues relating to the S�n test and m1 and m2 the p-vatues relaling to the first_ and seeond-otdef 
comtlation tfltS. 
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Table 9 
Oetermintants of relative labour productivity. Dependent Variable: logk10. Results 
with different estimation methods. 
First differencesJGMM L.velslGMM System estimator 
KPUDlTt -<),006 .a,D02 -0,002 
(0,7) (1,22) (0,53) 
KPU -0,201 -<),26 -<),2 
(0,35) (1,24) (0,11) 
KPUBCB -0,02 -0,003 -<),004 
(1,5) (1,15) (1,34) 
KPU100 -0,003 -0,005 ..(l,001 
(0,52) (1 ,74) (0,16) 
Results of columns 9, 10, 11 Y 12, table 7. 
Included as instruments are the regressors present in eaCh estimate lagged by one or two periods. First·step estimates, 
heteroskedasticity-robust Temporary and sectoral dummy variables have been included in all the regressions as regressors 
and instruments. The I-statistics are indicated in brackets. The p.values relating to the Sargan test are equal to zero for the 
four estimates. and also the p-values relating to the first- and second-order correlation tests are equal to zero. 
System of equations in firs-differences and levels. Included as instruments are the regressors present lagged by one or 
two periods for the equations in first-differences, and the lagged first-differences of the regressors for the level equations. First­
step estimates, heteroskedasUcity-robust. Temporary and sectoral dummy variables have been included in all the regressions 
as regressors and instruments. The t-statistics are indicated in braCkets. The p-values relaUng to the Sargan test are equal to 
zero fOf the four estimates, and also the p-values relating to the first· and second-order correlation tests are equal 10 zero, 
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Table 10 
Determinants of profitability. Dependent Variable: ran. Results with different 
estimation methods. 
First differenceslGMM LevelslGMM System estimator'"' 
KPUDIT -0,001 ·0,003 -0,001 
(0,4) (3,39) (1 ,22) 
KPU -0,Q1 ·0,27 -0,17 
(0,62) (3,37) (1,9) 
KPUBCB -0,001 ·0,003 -0,001 
(0,45) (3,15) (1,1) 
KPU100 0,001 -0,004 -0,001 
(0,42) (3,46) (1,17) 
Results of columns 9, 10, t 1 Y 12, lable 8. 
Included as instruments are the regressors present in each estimate lagged by one or two periods. First-step estimates. 
heteroskedasticity-robust. Temporary al"ld sectoral dunvny variables have been included In all the regressions as regressors 
and instruments. The I-statistics are indicated in braCkets. The p-values relating to the Sargan lest are equal to zero for the 
four estimates, and also the p-values relating to the first- and second-order correlation tests are equal to zero. 
System of equations in first-differences and levels. Included as instruments are the regressors present lagged by one or 
two periods for the equations in first-differences, and the lagged first-differences of the regressors for the level equations. First· 
step estimates, heteroskedasticity-robusl. Temporary and sectoral dummy variables have been included in all the regressions 
as regressors and instruments. The I·statistics are indicated in brackets. The p.values relating to the Sargan test are equal to 
zero for the four estimates, and also the p-values relating to the first- and second-order correlation tests are equal to zero. 
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ApPENDIX. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
A.1. SAMPLE SELECTION. 
The statistical source underpinning this paper has been the individual information of 
the non-financial corporations reporting to the Banco de Espana Central Balance Sheet 
Office (eSSE) during the period 1 983-1996. As the study has focused on manufactures, 
firms whose main activity is in energy, agriculture, construction and services were dropped 
from the sample. Moreover, firms which did not reply to the CSBE survey for at least four 
consecutive periods were also dropped. 
Lastly, the observations of those finns'exhibiting any of the characteristics detailed 
below were dropped: 
a) Zero employment and capital stock greater than zero. 
b) Net property, plant and equipment equal to zero. 
c) Negative or zero gross value added. 
d) Zero personnel costs. 
e) Negative or zero capital stock. 
f) Net amount of turnover negative or zero. 
g) Negative capital stock in one or more years, aU observations dropped. 
h) Negative interest on borrowed funds. 
i} Negative borrowed funds. 
The final sample resulting from this filtering process is an incomplete panel made up 
of 3,889 firms and a total of 32,035 observations. The distribution of the firms on the basis 
of the number of consecutive observations is detailed in Table A1 .  
Firms are classified by sector according to  the group of activities called "Major CSSE 
industries" (CS-26). Table A2 lists the sectors used, along with the associated CNAE 93 
(National Classification of Economic Activities) references and the number of observations 
relating to each sector. 
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Table A1 
Incomplete panel of firms 1983-1996 
No. of periods No. of firms 
4 
, 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
14 
Total 
607 
517 
440 
316 
334 
276 
284 
276 
19' 
218 
416 
3,889 
Table A2 
Industriat classification 
Sectors 
1. Manufacture offOOd, beverages and tobacco products 
2. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
3. Manufacture of other non..metaliic mineral products 
4. Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products 
5. Manufacture of machinery and equipment 
6. Manufacture of electrical, electronic and optical equipment and instruments 
7. Manufacture of transport equipment 
8. Manufacture of textiles and clothing 
9. leather and footwear industry 
10. Wood and cork industry 
11.  Putp, paper, publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
12. Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
13. Other manufacturing industries 
MANUfACTURING INDUSTRIES TOTAL 
- 46 -
No. of observations 
2,428 
2.585 
2,640 
2,212 
2,672 
2,484 
2,840 
3,036 
2,340 
2,834 
5,824 
32,035 
Reference 
CNAE 93 
15-16 
24 
26 
27·28 
29 
30-33 
34-3' 
17·18 
19 
20 
21-22 
25 
36-37 
No. of 
observations 
5,834 
3,807 
2,334 
3,301 
2,642 
2.018 
1,600 
3,224 
'" 
942 
2,314 
1,510 
1,598 
32,035 
A.2. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES30 
a} Individual variables 
AUTOFIN: undistributed profits as a proportion of total profits 
CFK: cash-flow per unit of capital, calculated as retained profrts plus provisions for 
depreciation deflated by the GOP deflator and divided by the stock of real capital. 
COSTEl: average personnel costs per employee. 
CUOTA: firm's sales as a percentage of total sales in the sector, adjusted for the 
sector's annual representativeness in terms of GVA, as deduced from CaSE publications. 
GINTERES: interest payments on borrowings as a percentage of output. 
GP: personnel costs as a proportion of gross value added. 
INSFIN: financial institutions' share as a percentage of the corporation's total capital 
stock. 
KL: capital/labour ratio, defined as capital stock/number of employees. 
KPU: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if any proportion of the firm's capital 
stock is public. 
KPUDlT: public capital as a percentage of total capital. 
KPUBCB: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the public sector holds more 
than 50% of the firm's capital stock or, irrespective of the percentage share, has control 
over the firm. 
KPU100: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the public sector holds 1 00% of 
the firm's capital stock. 
PERS: total employment defined as the sum of permanent plus temporary 
employment, which is obtained weighting the number of temporary employees with the 
average number of weeks worked in the firm. 
RAN: return on net assets, defined as the pre-tax profits/net assets ratio. 
Small case letters Ind;cate tnat variables are in Icgarithms. 
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/ 
REB: gross economic return defined as (gross value added less personnel 
costs)/sales. RVTAS: growth rate of sales. 
REND: proportion of debt per unit of assets. 
REXP: growth rate of exports. 
RG: resources generated, defined as (gross economic return - net financial charges 
+ other revenues - tax on profits)/sales. 
RIMP: growth rate of imports. 
RPERS: growth rate of the number of employees. 
RRP: return on equity, defined as pre-tax profits/equity. 
RVAB: growth rate of gross value added. 
SK: capital stock, calculated as the value at replacement cost of net property, plant 
and equipment. The value at replacement cost is obtained through the perpetual inventory , 
procedure (Salinger and Summers, 1 983, include a detailed description of this method in 
their appendix), taking the book value of the net property, plant and equipment as the value 
for the initial year. 
SKR: real capital stock, using the gross fixed capital formation deflator. 
SUBE: operating subsidies as a percentage of output. 
TEMP: temporary employment, calculated as temporary employment divided by total 
employment. 
XSVTS: export sales of the corporation as a percentage of its total sales. 
b) Aggregate variables 
CONC: share of the three largest firms' value added in relation to total value added 
for the sector, the latter being adjusted for the representativeness of the sector in the CSSE. 
LOGKML: logarithm of the capital/labour ratio. 
LOGPERS: logarithm of the number of employees. 
LKLSECx: LOGKML • NGSECx 
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LPSECx: LOGPERS • NGSECx 
NGSECx: dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to the sector x, 
and 0 otherwise. 
PENIM: import penetration, calculated as real imports in the sector divided by the 
sector's output at real market prices. 
VASVAT: value added in the sector according to National Accounts divided by total 
value added of manufactures. 
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